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**SUPPLEMENT 6**

**TO**

**JOINT EVALUATION OF**


**SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA**

PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee  
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

0200 HOURS

26 OCTOBER 1962



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## NOTICE

This supplement updates and amplifies previous reports. Emphasis is placed on the READINESS status, construction pace and any significant changes at the offensive missile sites in Cuba. This report is based primarily on preliminary analysis of the [ ] low-altitude photography, portions of which arrived during the preparation of this report (see Figure 1).

## SUMMARY

1. The [ ] photography of four MRBM sites shows continued rapid construction activity at each site. This activity apparently continues to be directed toward achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible. Camouflage and canvas covering of critical equipment is also continuing. As yet there is no evidence indicating any intention to move or dismantle these sites.
2. There is one change in the estimated dates of operational capability. San Cristobal MRBM Site 2 is estimated to achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead of 25 October, probably as a result of the heavy rain that has recently hit this site (see Figure 2).
3. No additional missiles, missile transporters, or erectors have been identified (see Table 1).
4. No new missile sites have been identified, although continued analysis of previous photography has revealed some road improvement activity in the Remedios area which is considered indicative of plans for the second IRBM site estimated for this area.
5. The three Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers continue their eastward course towards the USSR.

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## DISCUSSION

## OFFENSIVE MISSILE READINESS (Figure 2)

General

1. The available evidence clearly indicates that the field-type MRBM sites are for the SS-4 (SANDAL) 1020 nautical mile ballistic missile system. All of the essential elements of this system have been identified: canvas-covered missile transporters, launch stands, erectors, oxidizer and fuel trucks, cabling, theodolite stations, power generators, and communications equipment.

2. The evidence also clearly indicates that the Guanajay and Remedios sites are for a different missile system than that employed at the field-type MRBM sites. The pad design, size, and separation are compatible with what are believed to be IRBM installations in the USSR.

MRBM (1020-nm) SitesSan Cristobal Area3. Site 1 (22-40-05N 83-17-50W)

Last coverage: Low-level Mission [REDACTED]

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## a. Readiness Status

This site has a full operational capability at this time.

## b. Supporting Evidence

Photography confirms that all four launch stands and erectors are placed at the prepared launch positions and cabling has been laid from the launch stands to camouflaged control centers in the woods. Four probable

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theodolite stations have also been identified in the launch areas. Of the eight previously identified missile transporters, only four (without nosecones) are now visible. The four missing missile transporters are probably in the ready tents. All of the propellant trailers are present.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Four missiles in open storage have not been checked out or mated with their nosecones. The status of the four which have probably been moved into the missile ready tents cannot be determined; however, cabling can be seen running from the missile-ready tent into the woods where power generators are probably located. This strongly suggests that the missile is either being checked out or is being held in readiness.

4. Site 2 (22-41-00N 83-15-00W)

Last coverage: Low-level Mission [ ]

a. Readiness Status

This site which was previously estimated to have a full operational capability on 25 October will not achieve this capability until 26 October. Heavy rains (mud and standing water can be observed) probably has delayed construction.

b. Supporting Evidence

All four launch positions have been prepared and erectors and launch stands are emplaced at two of them. These two launch positions were under construction [ ] No erectors or launch stands are visible at the other two launch positions which were completed [ ] No cabling or theodolite stations can be observed at the launch positions. A total of three missile-ready tents have now been erected.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Preparation of all launch pads has been completed. Three missile-ready tents are now visible and only three of the five missile transporters

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can be observed. Cabling from two missile-ready tents into the woods, probably to generators, is an indication that two missiles are being checked out.

5. Site 3 (22-42-40N 83-08-25W)

Last coverage: Low-level [REDACTED]

a. Readiness Status

This site is considered to have a full operational capability.

b. Supporting Evidence

All four erectors and launch stands appear to be in place at the prepared launch positions. Cabling has been laid and four probable theodolite stations have been identified about 60 to 70 feet from the pads. Only four missile-ready tents have been erected. Construction activity is still continuing in the probable regimental support area adjacent to the launch site. Only four of the eight permanent barracks-type buildings have been completed. Personnel are still quartered in tents.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

No propellant trailers have arrived at this site, and only one possible missile transporter has been observed. Although this site has a full operational capability, missiles and propellants would have to be brought in from another location.

6. Site 4 (22-46-55N 82-58-50W)

Last coverage: [REDACTED]

a. Readiness Status

This site will probably achieve full operational capability on 28 October.

b. Supporting Evidence

There has been no new photographic evidence [REDACTED] However, available evidence and comparison with other sites in this area tend

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[REDACTED]

to support the above estimate.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Low-level photography of [REDACTED] was not available at the time this report was prepared.

Sagua La Grande Area

7. Site 1 (22-43-44N 80-01-40W)

Last coverage: Low-level [REDACTED]

a. Readiness Status

This site is considered to have a full operational capability.

b. Supporting Evidence

Only one launch position was covered by this mission, but it appeared to be complete with erector, launch stand and installed cabling. Fifteen oxidizer and eight fuel trailers are in the propellant storage area.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Construction activity is continuing.

8. Site 2 (22-39-10N 79-51-55W)

Last coverage: Low-level [REDACTED]

a. Readiness Status

This site is considered to have a full operational capability.

b. Supporting Evidence

Four canvas-covered erectors and launch stands are in place on prepared launch positions, with cabling in place. There are now three missile transporters and six missile-ready tents in the site area. Additional camouflage measures are being taken at one position to cover the entire launch area. A full complement of eight fuel and sixteen oxidizer trailers are present.

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c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

It appears that increased activity and site preparation is taking place.

IRBM (2200 nm) Sites

Guanajay Area

9. Site 1 (22-57-00N 82-39-25W)

Last coverage: Low-level [ ]

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a. Readiness Status

It is estimated that this IRBM site will have an emergency operational capability on 15 November and full operational capability by 1 December providing construction activity continues.

b. Supporting Evidence

The four concrete pads and control building are in a late stage of construction.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Preliminary analysis of new photography indicates that further construction progress has been made at the site, although no personnel could be observed in the area at the time of photography.

10. Site 2 (22-57-25N 82-36-55W)

Last coverage: Low-level [ ]

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a. Readiness Status

It is estimated that this IRBM site will have an emergency operational capability by 1 December and full operational capability by 15 December providing construction activity continues as previously observed.

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b. Supporting Evidence

There is construction activity at the launch control building at the west pair of pads and at all four pad areas.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Preparation of this launch site continues.

Remedios Area

11. Site 1 (22-25-00N 79-35-00W)

Last coverage: [ ]

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a. Readiness Status

This site should have an emergency operational capability by 1 December and full operational capability by 15 December.

b. Supporting Evidence

No new photography of this site is available.

c. Significant Trends Since Last Report

Additional analysis of low-level photography [ ] shows that an improved road with wide radius turns has been observed approximately 3 1/2 miles southeast of this site. The road terminates at the edge of a wooded area which may possibly be the planned location for a second site in the Remedios area. The large amount of prefabricated concrete forms and other construction material in open storage areas would be adequate to support an additional site.

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Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

No change

Support and Supply

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14. The three Soviet ships suspected of being possible ballistic missile carriers, reported yesterday to have altered their course, continue their eastward course toward the USSR.

Coastal Defense Missiles

No change

Air Defense Missiles

15. During the past 24-hour period there has been no change in the status of the 24 operational SAM sites. [REDACTED]

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17. The [REDACTED] low-level photographic coverage of the Bahia Hondo SAM site indicates that three permanent barracks-type buildings have been constructed and have apparently taken the place of the personnel tents observed previously. If all three buildings are EM barracks, the personnel strength at the SAM sites in Cuba would appear to be consistent with that of a SAM site in the Soviet Union (estimated 35 officers and 112 EM). Preliminary analysis of the Cuban SAM sites appears to indicate that the standard SA-2 associated support equipment is being deployed at the sites and their support facilities.

18. [REDACTED] construction activity on the SAM sites is continuing.

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TABLE 1

## SUMMARY OF MRBM AND IRBM THREAT IN CUBA

Status as of 0200 hours on 26 October 1962

Locations	Sites		Launchers		Missiles		Facilities For Nuclear Warheads
	Total Identified	Probably Planned	Total Identified	Probably Deployed*	Total Identified	Prob Basic Load**	
<u>MRBM - Range 1020-nm (non-rotating earth)</u>							
San Cristobal (2 regts)	4	4	15	16	23	32	2 prob facilities under construction
Sagua La Grande (1 regt)	2	2	8	8	10	16	1 prob facility under construction
MRBM TOTAL	6	6	23	24	33	48	
<u>IRBM - Range 2200-nm (non-rotating earth)</u>							
Guanajay (1 regt)	2	2	8 under construction	8	0	16	1 prob facility under construction

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Locations	Sites		Launchers		Missiles		Facilities For Nuclear Warheads
	Total Identified	Probably Planned	Total Identified	Probably Deployed*	Total Identified	Prob Basic Load**	
Remedios (1 regt)	1	2	4 under construction	8	0	16	1 prob facility under construction
IRBM TOTAL	3	4	12 under construction	16	0	32	
GRAND TOTAL	9	10	35	40	33	80	

\* This reflects an estimate of 8 operational launchers authorized per regiment..

\*\* This reflects an estimate of 16 operational missiles per regiment.




FIGURE 1. SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA.




FIGURE 2. ESTIMATED CHRONOLOGY OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE READINESS IN CUBA

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


FIGURE 3. LOCATION OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES AND PROBABLE NUCLEAR STORAGE IN CUBA.

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